Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Nonetheless, the straightforward steps taken by established institutions enabled the United States to derail depression dynamics, while European 1930s-style austerity proved as ineffective as it was almost a century ago. Europe's, and specifically Germany's, steadfast refusal to embrace the US recipe has fostered mushrooming economic hardship on the continent. The situation is gruesome, and any serious student of economic history had to have known, given European policy commitments, that it was destined to turn out this way.
It is easy to understand why misguided policies drove initial European responses.
Economic theory has frowned on Keynes. Economic successes, especially in Germany, offered up the wrong lessons, and enduring angst about inflation was a major distraction. At the outset, the wrong medicine for the wrong disease was to be expected.
What is much harder to fathom is why such a poisonous elixir continues to be proffered amid widespread evidence that the patient is dying. Deconstructing cognitive dissonance in other spheres provides an explanation. Not surprisingly, knowing what one wants to happen at home completely informs one's claims concerning what will be good for one's neighbors. In such a construct, the last best hope for Europe is ECB President Mario Draghi. He seems to be able to speak German and yet act European. He pointed out that the legacy of the Great Depression in the US was that, independent of the political party in power, essential things were delivered by the "big government" and the "big bank":
Big government stands behind economy-wide deposit insurance.
Big government "knows instinctively" that it must recapitalize commercial banks.
Big government supports demand via automatic stabilizers.
Big government supplements demand support via fiscal stimulus.
To complement "big government" efforts, Big bank's massive liquidity infusion restores market flows. Big bank's liquidity infusion renders big government borrowing an easy proposition. Big bank's aggressive ease counters market risk aversion. They collapse the risk-free rate, force money out of the risk curve, and restart the economy's credit engine.
In short, having a national entity that stood ready to guarantee bank deposits and replenish bank capital was essential to derail the bank deflation dynamic. Likewise, via automatic stabilizers and proactive legislation, fiscal policy was brought to bear to support demand. The central bank, created with Bagehot's insights in mind, knew that its essential role was as lender of last resort. It stood ready to provide liquidity to private markets and to make public sector borrowing easy. Additionally, it came to understand that aggressive commitment to ease was the necessary antidote to the violent shift toward risk aversion, which is one of the hallmarks of serious financial crises.
What about inflation? In the late 1970s and early 1980s, amid a virulent inflationary dynamic, central banks practiced intermittent disinflation. They attended to inflation-fighting responsibilities, but interrupted such efforts when they threatened the safety and soundness of the financial system. However, since the mid-1980s, inflationary pressures, despite central bank focus, have in fact been a sideshow. Center stage since l987 has been the interaction between financial system swings and the real economy's boom and bust cycle. 
Ignore Minsky at Your Peril
The 2007-09 financial system collapse in important ways actually exceeded the 1930s experience. Accordingly, enlisting Minsky's menu of stabilization strategies has never been more important in the postwar period. Roughly speaking, that is what occurred in the US. In Europe, instead, these time-honored, albeit reviled, rescue traditions were ignored. And we confront today the devastating legacy of those decisions.
In the US, despite a great deal of free market rhetoric and teeth gnashing, the multifaceted safety net was employed. The US now sports functioning banks, a nascent rebound in residential real estate in the bubble states, and three years of slow but steady economic growth. That said, the US just concluded an election wherein the losing candidate had, as a platform position, a desire to replace its central bank chairman, largely on the grounds that he did too much to try to make things better. And at the moment, there is some risk that, by default, the US will slide into recession as a consequence of automatic draconian austerity. But although the US is threatening to be stupid, so far, at least, it has done okay.
In stark contrast, the 17 nations saddled with the euro and its steward, the ECB, remain trapped in a system of still dysfunctional banks, deteriorating depression-like conditions for bubble states, and in aggregate, a return to recession. This tragedy, in part, reflects the fact that the institutions in place among the euro nations are not set up to easily respond as Minsky insisted they should. The absence of these vital institutions is not entirely an accident of course, as many of the architects of Europe argued and continue to insist that such institutions and policies are not necessary.
In sum, as a consequence of institutional inadequacies and insanely wrongheaded policymaker biases, euro nations, altogether, have slid closer to a repeat of the Great Depression than any developed economy since the 1930s. 2 The Cost of Capitalism, R.J. Barbera, 2009 This paper asks the question, why? More specifically, amid three years of failure, with a robust literature speaking to the error of their strategies, why did the core nations insist on doubling and then tripling down on their failed plan? As jobless rates soared, riots proliferated, and financial market fissures multiplied, what possible motivation caused policymakers, then and now, to insist that ever more austerity, redoubled central bank indifference to anything but prices, and impossible-to-achieve host nation responsibility for banks was the right way to go? Why, indeed? Trichet and Weber, with horrified looks on their faces, implore the Americans to reconsider.
FINANCIAL CRISIS REVISITED

Banks must be held accountable or restructured in the areas in which they reside.
Fiscal austerity applied in earnest will be stimulative, as it brings confidence to all businesses. So, too, will vigilant monetary policy-policy aimed exclusively at keeping inflation at bay. This is our plan.
Summers guffaws,
No euro-wide bank bailout will translate into continued credit contraction for the periphery. Austerity, in the short run, ALWAYS drives economies DOWN, not up. And easy money is the only way to ease pressures on public and private borrowers, and thereby end the adverse feedback loop that the Great Recession has begun. Your policies will doom Europe to deep retrenchment and probable euro break-up.
Trichet retorts,
Public monies for bank bailouts create great moral hazard. Swelling deficits will drive your bond yields sharply higher, crowding out business investment. Printing money means a plunging currency and sharply higher inflation. These policies will ensure your economic malaise for the next decade.
Facts on the Ground
How did things work out? On nearly all counts, European hopes were dashed. Likewise, their admonitions about risks to US policies all proved to be wrong. In general, US economic barometers tilted into positive territory. There was much that was lacking in the US effort, but from fall 2009 through late fall 2012, the US economy grew modestly, amid tame inflation, and was blessed by a slow but discernible fall in unemployment-down roughly two percentage points over the period.
In Europe, the resulting devastation for the real economy has been breathtaking. From fall 2009 through late 2012, European economies, one by one, either watched nascent rebounds expire or watched recessions dramatically worsen. Aggregate statistics tell the tale, though they disguise the depth of the disaster. European unemployment is in the midst of a second climb, as the continental economy has double-dipped. Thus, measures of joblessness in the US and Europe were as passing ships in the night. As the US rate fell back from 10 percent to a bit less than 8 percent, the European rate soared, climbing from 10 percent to nearly 12 percent at last count. Real GDP growth tells the same story. Both Europe and the US emerge from recession with tepid recoveries, output gains averaging around 2 percent. Over the four quarters through the third quarter of 2012, however, US economic growth improved ever so slightly. In painful contrast, policy ineptitude in Europe delivered a double dip, as output contracted by 0.6 percent over the period. Again, however, the aggregate statistics mask insane devastation in a number of countries. Greece, all agree, played a central role in its own demise. But the horrific state of affairs with unemployment now at 10.7 percent in Italy, 14.8 percent in Ireland, and a breathtaking 25.5 percent in Spain is profoundly sad. To put Spain's plight in some simple mathematical context, at the end of September 2007, Spain's jobless rate stood at 8.4 percent.
Generalized strikes, regional threats of cessation, and emasculated political leadership, all come with the territory when economies collapse. And Spain's economy has done precisely that. 
Recent Results
The chart below, taken from The Economist blog, in combination with a chart from Paul Krugman on joblessness (Figure 1 ), make it clear that American policy won the debate imagined in Section 2.
Figure 2 American exceptionalism
Source: Avent (2012) Indeed, America's strategy delivered some upside and all but completely avoided the downside consequences that Europeans asserted were inescapable amid super easy policies. A debauched currency and climbing inflation and long-term interest rates were alleged to be near at hand after each of three rounds of quantitative easing (QE) . And yet, as the table below makes clear, US inflation has done nothing. Indeed, whether one looks at 10-year inflation, 3-year inflation, 1-year inflation, or inflation over the past six months, if anything is in the data, it is evidence of fading inflationary pressures. Likewise, US long-term interest rates have trended lower and the dollar over the past several years is a bit higher versus the hard-money, austerity crowd of Europe. The only bouts with pressure emanated from commodity prices, captive to China.
It is also important to recognize that both inflation and deflation were absent, in any meaningful sense. Persistent large output gaps (PLOGs) face asymptotic wage and price curves as we get closer to de minimus price pressures. The ZERO Bound, it turns out, is an interesting concept for both monetary policy and for pressures on prices and wages-wages and prices are particularly sticky when outright declines loom.
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This leads, inescapably, to the second conclusion. If deflation is very hard to generate, then a central bank focused solely on inflation will deliver sub-optimal policy. If you look solely at prices, you will suffer substantial output and employment losses, relative to a central bank focusing on prices and jobs. In practice, there is no divine coincidence that delivers comparable results for one-and two-target central banks.
EUROPE'S OTHER LAMENTABLE OUTCOMES
Penalty Borrowing Rates, Bank Balkanization amid Silent Runs
The fact that austerity makes economies contract and that central banks that are focused singularly on inflation versus dual mandates produce sub-optimal outcomes is the oft-heard 
Default Risk vs. Inflation Risk and Self-Fulfilling Sovereign Debt Crises
Why does Italy pay 4.9 percent for 10-year money and the UK 1.8 percent? We all know both nations have difficult fiscal situations that will be hard to balance. The UK's deficit is much larger than Italy's. Italy has a much larger outstanding stock of debt-difficulties of roughly comparable proportions. Nonetheless, the British borrowing rate is miniscule compared to that of Italy. The reason for this powerful spread, of course, is that a lender to the UK risks being paid in inflated pounds, but she knows she will get paid, thanks to the printing press at the Bank of England. In stark contrast, Italy has no printing press, and so, like a state borrower in the US, it could default on its loans. What is bizarre, of course, for Italy, is that its fiscal situation is not particularly threatening if it has UK interest rates. Thus, the absence of a central bank backstop produces the self-fulfilling prophesy of default risk in Italy.
These considerations seem quite straightforward. Yet they are vehemently denied by many in charge in Europe. And that makes them all the more important. As Keynes (1936) put it, "The difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas as in escaping from old ones."
UNLEARNING HISTORY
The Formative Years and Formulating the Wrong Diagnosis
How can so much policy be so terribly wrong? What people believe about economic policy is conditioned by three things:
The economic textbooks they have read and what they were taught as students.
Their own experience. should put to bed all loose talk of "as if" theorizing.
What should be common ground is that the real world is a much more turbulent place than the smoothly adjusting, full-employment world of the dynamic general equilibrium model.
Events that happen every 10, 20, or even 70 years cannot really be "10 sigma" events. There's something wrong with the model. Even those who cling to such theorizing most of the time must recognize that the system has pathologies that the models do not encompass. From time to time, the wheels come off and the system can crash in a spectacular way. And we cannot always blame it on the government. What exactly was the crime of the Spanish or Irish government in the run-up to 2008? Monetary policy? They had ceded that to the ECB, which was then being run on impeccable Bundesbank principles. Fiscal policy? They were running budget surpluses.
Any rational post mortem of the 2007-09 crash must acknowledge that private speculation induced a spectacular instability in the way that Minsky foresaw and anatomised 40 years ago. In the crisis that such instability can generate, the "business as usual" policy maxims have to be abandoned. The first point is that many policymakers were, as Keynes put it, "prisoners of defunct economists."
Secondly, the experience of many German policymakers also led them astray. For a half century after World War II, Germany managed its economy as if it were a small open economy.
It wasn't too concerned about domestic demand, instead preferring to concentrate on keeping inflation expectations and wage settlements down relative to productivity growth, building international competitiveness and growing via trade. That was a very successful strategy and certainly better than the "stop-go" policies of the UK as it tried to manipulate aggregate demand. Generations of German policymakers became persuaded that their way was the virtuous way and their longstanding success was the reward for such virtue. 
From Bad to Worse amid Collective Cognitive Dissonance
All of the above explain Core Nation's initial desires to see things from their own historical and theoretical perspective. But three years into this set of failed policies, how can we explain such persistent denial of fact? Sadly, we need to remind ourselves that denying the obvious when the obvious hurts is a longstanding human trait. Indeed, in the US, two instances occurred quite recently. On election night, many Republican strategists and enthusiasts were dumbfounded that Barack Obama was reelected. This was true despite the fact that a straightforward analysis of polling data in the last days leading up to the election gave Romney less than a 10 percent chance of victory. We need to work backward. Germany fervently believes it must preserve its competitiveness, its fiscal rectitude, and its spotless inflation record. On these key issues, therefore, Germans have no appetite for thinking collectively.
Accordingly, Germans reject, without analysis, assertions that Germany must take a different route, accepting continental bank bailouts and bank insurance, engaging in stimulus at home, and acquiescing to somewhat faster gains for domestic wages. Instead, they label such proposed changes as blasphemy, and profess that these prescriptions are all wrong for Europe.
All wrong, perhaps for Germany, but the only hope for Europe.
GUARDA LE MANI, NON ASCOLTARE LA BOCCA-WATCH THE HANDS, IGNORE THE MOUTH
Conducting European policy to preserve German precepts over the last several years has returned Europe to recession and threatens the euro itself. The best hope for Europe going forward is ECB President Mario Draghi. Draghi's predecessor at the ECB, Jean Claude Trichet, embraced the German script with gusto, helping to put Europe into the dire state it finds itself in today. Mario Draghi, however, has twice engineered an end run of the Bundesbank. His willingness and ability to conduct monetary policy with an eye toward Europe and an appreciation of the reality of the circumstances at hand are Europe's best hope.
Long-term refinancing operations (LTRO) allowed banks to get long-term funding.
Outright monetary transactions, if implemented with gusto, can greatly reduce the penalty rates that are now imposed on periphery country borrowers. Both of these policies were vehemently opposed by the Bundesbank. Both would have been music to Hyman Minsky's ears.
Accordingly, we offer up some advice to Draghi. In the US, commitment to free markets and to the unwavering inflation fighting of the Federal Reserve Bank has been standard rhetoric since
Paul Volcker assumed the chair in 1978. That never stopped the Fed from responding aggressively to Minsky moments. Keep preaching Bundesbank orthodoxy, but continue to find ways to practice Minsky-inspired depression-fighting tactics.
Even so, Dr. Draghi will sooner or later require the conversion of other policymakers. A unified banking system with generalized deposit insurance is a must. That-not constitutional amendments demanding balanced budgets-should be the first objective of Europe's policy elites. If a coordinated European fiscal policy is required, it is one of aggressive expansion in states like Germany and the Netherlands running current account surpluses balanced by longerterm programs of phased fiscal consolidation elsewhere. It is a tall order given the present starting point. We wish him the best.
